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EXPLORING THE BOUNDARIES OF
DISCRETIONARY IMMUNITY IN
OKLAHOMA: NGUYEN V. STATE
I.

INTRODUCTION

When the government releases a confined mental patient with a history of violence or dangerousness, should the victim of crimes committed
by the released patient be allowed to seek compensation by means of civil
action against the government? Individuals must be adequately protected from the improper use of official decision-making power to release
potentially dangerous mental patients into society.' Although the patient
has a right to effective treatment, the public has a right to "relief against
governmental misconduct." 2 The competing interests of the public's
safety and the patient's treatment must be balanced.3
In 1990, the Oklahoma Supreme Court faced a case of first impression, Nguyen v. State,4 involving the appeal of a wrongful death action
for a murder committed by a mental patient who had been released from
a state facility. Oklahoma's Governmental Tort Claims Act' waives sovereign immunity in some cases but excepts discretionary acts of the state
or its employees from this waiver. Based on the discretionary function
exemption, the lower court granted the state's motion to dismiss.6 On
appeal, the Oklahoma Supreme Court established that release decisions
are not extended immunity by the discretionary function exception to
sovereign liability and that the state must seek shelter from civil liability
under a provision that provides immunity for acts done in conformance
with "current recognized standards." 7 The court's decision follows the
trend of imposing liability on the tortfeasor while protecting good faith
1. See Vanderpool v. State, 672 P.2d 1153 (Okla. 1983). There, the court noted that
"[r]eexamination of the soundness of the concept of governmental immunity in the light of the expanded role of government in today's society has... resulted in a retreat from the concept both
legislatively and by case law." Id. at 1155.
2. Jaffe, Suits Against Governments and Officers" Damage Actions, 77 HARV. L. REV. 209
(1963).
3. 19 AM. JUR. 2D Proofof Facts 583, 596 (1979).
4. 788 P.2d 962 (Okla. 1990).
5. OKLA. STAT. tit. 51, §§ 151-172 (1981 & Supp. 1990).
6. Nguyen, 788 P.2d at 963.
7. Id. at 966. OKLA. STAT. tit. 51, § 155(28) (1981 & Supp. 1990) provides that "[t]he state or
a political subdivision shall not be liable ifa loss or claim results from... [a]cts or omissions done in
conformance with then current recognized standards."
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decisions.' By pushing decisions to release mental patients from state
hospitals out from behind the protective shield of the discretionary function exception to Oklahoma's waiver of sovereign immunity, the Nguyen
decision forces the state to take a closer look at potentially negligent

releases.
II.
A.

HISTORY OF IMMUNITIES

Broad History and Origin of Sovereign Immunity

Certain societal goals or values have dictated that some entities be
free of, or immune to, liability for torts.9 Thus, historically, charities,
governments, sovereigns, and even family members have been extended

blanket immunity from tort liability for various purposes including protecting the public pocket book,"0 preserving the dignity of the King, 1
and preserving the family unit. 2 These categories were outcome-determinative and arbitrary in their results.13 The doctrine of sovereign immu-

nity has traditionally offered the sovereign, or government, complete
protection from any and all tort liability.14 This doctrine, derived from

the legal structure of England,"5 centered on the idea that "the King
could do no wrong." 6 Sovereign immunity was also supported by the
concept that courts, as a branch of government, should not be used
8. An extensive list of cases demonstrating judicial disapproval of immunity appears in Vanderpool v. State, 672 P.2d 1153, 1156 n.9 (Okla. 1983).
9. W. KEETON, D. DOBBS, R. KEETON & D. OWEN, PROSSER & KEETON ON THE LAW OF
TORTS § 131 (5th ed. 1984) [hereinafter PROSSER & KEETON].
The idea was that, though the defendant might be a wrongdoer, social values of great
importance required that the defendant escape liability. The immunity thus might be
thought to differ from a privilege, such as the privilege of self-defense, which may reflect
the judgment that the defendant's action is not tortious at all, or if tortious, is morally
justified.
Id
10. Payton v. United States, 679 F.2d 475, 487 (5th Cir. 1982).
11. Comment, DiscretionaryImmunity in Californiain the Aftermath of Johnson v. State, 15
SANTA CLARA L. 454, 454 (1975).
12. PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 9, § 122, at 902.
13. See Jaffe, supranote 2, at 218. "The dichotomy between 'ministerial' and 'discretionary' it
[sic] at the least unclear, and one may suspect that it is a way of stating rather than arriving at the
result." Id
14. PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 9, § 131. at 1033.
15. Reynolds, The DiscretionaryFunction Exception of the Federal Tort Claims Act, 57 GEO.
L.J. 81, 81 (1968) (quoting Baer, Suing Uncle Sam in Tort, 26 N.C.L. Rev. 119 (1948)). "It seems an
anomaly that the theory 'the King can do no wrong' could become so entrenched in the laws of a
country founded on the precept that the King had indeed done wrong." Id.
16. Feres v. United States, 340 U.S. 135, 139-40 (1950). "mhe political theory that the King
could do no wrong was repudiated in America," although our courts have historically supported the
doctrine of sovereign immunity. Id.
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against the government without its consent. 17
Catalyzed by changing attitudes and understandings, 8 the entire
idea of immunity is now being judicially and legislatively limited or abandoned. Courts, demonstrating a growing disenchantment with the protection of immunities, are displaying increasing disapproval of absolute
sovereign immunity.' 9 Federal and state governments have legislatively
responded to this trend by statutorily weakening or abolishing the princi-

ple of sovereign immunity.2°
B. FederalSovereign Immunity
Congress responded to the need that evolved&2 ' for broadening the
Federal shoulders of liability for tortious behavior by enacting the Fed-

eral Tort Claims Act (FTCA)22 in 1946 with the stated purpose of initiating "novel and unprecedented" governmental liability.2 3 The FTCA
waives governmental immunity and allows the federal government to be
sued for injury "caused by the negligent or wrongful act or omission of
any employee of the Government while acting within the scope of his
office or employment" in instances where a private person would be liable under the same circumstances. 24 Despite this comprehensive language, the FTCA retains a measure of immunity by including certain
exceptions.

Under one exception, sovereign immunity is not waived where the
act or omission is "based upon the exercise or performance or the failure
to exercise or perform a discretionaryfunction or duty on the part of a
federal agency, or an employee of the Government, whether or not the
17. Note, Separation of Powers and the DiscretionaryFunction Exception: PoliticalQuestion in
Tort LitigationAgainst the Government, 56 IowA L. REv. 930, 946 (1971).
18. PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 9.
19. See supra note 8.
20. See Comment, Misapplicationof GovernmentalImmunity - Epting v. Utah, 1976 UTAH L.
REV. 186, 187.
21. See Feres v. United States, 340 U.S. 135, 140 (1950). Prior to enactment of the Federal
Tort Claims Act, Congress could grant a private bill to waive sovereign immunity in a specific case.
As the requests for these private bills increased, a two-fold pressure mounted on Congress. First,
Congress needed to lighten their own burden by shifting this duty to resolve private claims to the
courts. Second, Congress needed to provide for more equitable treatment of individuals injured by
torts of the federal government. Id. See also Gottlieb, Tort Claims Against the United States, 30
GEO.L.J. 462, 464 (1942) for information about the requests for private bills and the pressure created on Congress by their volume during 1939-40.
22. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1346, 2671-80 (1982 & Supp. 1990).
23. Johnson v. United States, 749 F.2d 1530, 1533 (11th Cir. 1985) (quoting Rayonier Inc. v.
United States, 352 U.S. 315, 319 (1957)). See also Appellants' Brief-in-Chief at 3, Nguyen, 788 P.2d
962 (Okla. 1990) (No. 71,844).
24. 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b) (1982).
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discretion involved be abused."25 The discretionary function exemption is
a pivotal jurisdictional limit because it exempts all claims based upon the
exercise of a discretionary function or duty.2 6 The exemption differentiates discretionary actions from ministerial actions, with immunity extending only to conduct that springs from discretionary functions or
duties. Establishing the scope of discretionary immunity, however, has
caused great conflict and controversy among litigants and courts.
The seminal case regarding the discretionary function exception was
Dalehite v. United States,27 where the United States Supreme Court
found the discretionary exception to be a wide door that often swings on
the hinges of whether or not the action involved policy judgment. The
Dalehite court relied on the distinction between planning decisions (discretionary) and operational decisions (non-discretionary). Applying the
planning-operational test stringently in the government's favor, the
Court held that "[w]here there is room for policy judgment and decision
there is discretion."' 2 The Court, however, declined to conclusively de29
fine the discretionary function exception.
Subsequent Supreme Court decisions have reaffirmed the planningoperational distinction, while greatly narrowing the Dalehite parameters
for discretionary functions. 30 The decisions indicate that initial decisionmaking may be immune from liability but the execution of those decisions is not.3 1 In addition, it appears that there is a measure of governmental importance in discretionary actions, while non-discretionary
actions are more routine and lack this type of larger gravity.32 Because
almost every action could be described as discretionary, the Supreme
Court has placed significant emphasis on whether the activity is one that
Congress intended to protect from liability. 33 Nonetheless, the Court has
25. 28 U.S.C. § 2680(a) (1982) (emphasis added).

26. See Dalehite v. United States, 346 U.S. 15 (1953) (Government dismissed as a defendant
based on the discretionary function exception).

27. 346 U.S. 15 (1953).
28. Id. at 36.
29. Id. at 35. "It is unnecessary to define, apart from this case, precisely where discretion

ends." Id.
30. See Berkovitz v. United States, 486 U.S. 531 (1988); Indian Towing Co. v. United States,
350 U.S. 61 (1955).
31. See supra note 30.
32. Jaffe, supra note 2, at 237.
33. Berkovitz, 486 U.S. at 536. In Berkovitz, the Court questioned "whether [the] judgment is
of the kind that the discretionary function exception was designed to shield." Id. Similarly, the
Court in United States v. Varig Airlines, 467 U.S. 797 (1984) questioned whether the conduct was
"of the nature and quality that Congress intended to shield from tort liability." Id. at 813.
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continued to express unwillingness to conclusively define the discretionary exception.3 4
Despite the ambiguity, the use of the basic planning-operational
analysis to differentiate between discretionary and non-discretionary actions now enjoys extensive application in federal and state courts.
Although the distinction between planning and operational decisions is
often difficult to apply, it generally charges governmental employees with
the duty of non-negligent execution of policy/planning decisions.35
In actions entailing the negligent release of mental patients, the delineation between discretionary and non-discretionary functions has
often been a critical task.3 6 Under Federal law, the release of a mental
patient is ordinarily considered a ministerial, non-discretionary action
performed in the wake of policy formation.3 7 Consequently, under the
FTCA, liability for injuries caused by the mentally ill has frequently been
imposed on the public facilities treating them.38
C. Purposes of DiscretionaryImmunity
Understanding the fundamental purposes behind the protection of
discretionary immunity is crucial to its application. Our government's
separation of powers dictates that discretionary legislative and executive
39
decisions be protected from judicial review advanced by civil liability.
The functionality of our government requires that a waiver of sovereign
immunity not interfere with governmental decision-making and policysetting by granting the judiciary the ultimate authority to review such
34. United States v. Varig Airlines, 467 U.S. 797 (1984) [hereinafter yarig]. The Varig Court
stated that "[als in Dalehiteit is unnecessary-and indeed impossible-to define with precision every
contour of the discretionary function exception." Id. at 813.
The Supreme Court in Berkovitz while agreeing with Varig, offered more clarification of the
exception as it relates to regulated activities. The Court in Berkovitz refused to bring all regulatory
activities within the exception, stating that "[wlhen a suit charges an agency with failing to act in
accord with a specific mandatory directive, the discretionary function exception does not apply."
Berkovitz 486 U.S. at 545 (emphasis added). The Court reasoned that an employee's actions do not
involve discretion when that action has been specifically prescribed by policy or regulation. The very
purpose of specific requirements is to curtail the use of employee judgment. Id. at 538-39.
35. Comment, supra note 20, at 188-90.
36. The discretionary function exemption has been the widely-used defense in actions based on
the negligent release of a mental patient. See Comment, supra note 11, at 454.
37. See Underwood v. United States, 356 F.2d 92 (5th Cir. 1966); Lipari v. Sears, Roebuck &
Co., 497 F. Supp. 185 (D. Neb. 1980).
38. Comment, Tort Liabilityfor CaliforniaPublicPsychiatricFacilitie" Time for a Change, 29
SANTA CLARA L. REv. 459, 481 (1989).
39. Elgin v. District of Columbia, 337 F.2d 152 (D.C. Cir. 1964). The government must "operate freely and without the inhibiting influence of potential legal liability asserted with the advantage
of hindsight." Id at 154-55. See also Note, supra note 17 at 946.
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matters.'4 The courts cannot endeavor to ascertain when government
decisions are reasonable4 1 and the courts are not "equipped to investigate
'42
and weigh the factors which enter into the decision of other branches.
A second purpose of the discretionary function exemption is protection
of the public purse. The necessity of thwarting unacceptable financial
costs that could result from making all government decisions subject to
judicial assessment is inherent in the basic concept of immunity.4 3 Governmental tort liability could debilitate the government financially, thus
impairing the delivery of services to the general public.
D.

Oklahoma's History of Sovereign Immunity

The State of Oklahoma has followed a path similar to many other
states in an agonized transition from absolute sovereign immunity to limited immunity. Prior to 1978, Oklahoma and every state entity, including all political subdivisions, operated under the common law doctrine of
absolute sovereign immunity.'
The state held a position similar to the
pre-FTCA federal posture-the state could not be sued without legislative authorization. Consent required passage by the legislature of a private bill waiving immunity in that particular case.45
Several events eventually led to the legislative withdrawal of absolute immunity for political subdivisions of Oklahoma and, ultimately, the
state itself. The common law sovereign immunity of political subdivisions was first weakened by a number of cases. 46 Responding to the judicial weakening of absolute immunity in Oklahoma as well as other
states, 7 the Oklahoma legislature exposed political subdivisions to liabil4
ity by enacting the Political Subdivision Tort Claims Act (PTCA) 1 of
40. See Note, supra note 17 at 946.
41. United States v. Varig Airlines, 467 U.S. 797 (1984). The Supreme Court stated that one
purpose of the discretionary function exception is "to prevent judicial 'second-guessing' of legislative
and administrative decisions grounded in social, economic and political policy through the medium
of a tort suit." Id at 814. See also Jaffe, supra note 2, at 237.
42. Payton v. United States, 679 F.2d 475, 487 (5th Cir. 1982). See also Jafle, supra note 2, at
237.
43. See Reynolds, supra note 15, at 122.
44. In 1978, the Oklahoma Legislature passed the Political Subdivision Torts Claim Act, which
was replaced by the Governmental Tort Claims Act in 1985. OKLA. STAT. tit. 51, §§ 151-170
(1978), repealed by OKLA. STAT. tit. 51 §§ 151-172 (1981 & Supp. 1990).
45. See supra note 21 and accompanying text.
46. See Vanderpool v. State, 672 P.2d 1153 (Okla. 1983); State ex reL State Insurance Fund v.
Bone, 344 P.2d 562 (Okla. 1959).
47. See Jones v. State Highway Commission, 557 S.W.2d 225 (Mo. 1977); Mayle v. Pennsylvania Department of Highways, 479 Pa. 382, 388 A.2d 709 (1978).
48. OKLA.STAT. tiLt.
51, §§ 151-170 (1978), repealedby OKLA. STAT. tit. 51, §§ 151-172 (1981
& Supp. 1990).
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1978. The PTCA waived immunity for cities, counties, and school districts, but left the state itself immune. 49
The Oklahoma Supreme Court, frustrated by the absence of consti-

tutional restrictions50 and the lack of legislative action to limit the immu-

nity of the state itself, carved the first inroad weakening absolute state

immunity from liability in a 1959 decision, State ex rel. State Insurance
Fund v. Bone. 1 There, the court made limited state liability possible by
holding that the distinction between governmental and proprietary functions was dispositive in deciding if the state could use the immunity defense.5 2 This distinction between governmental and propriety functions

circumvented absolute immunity by allowing possible recovery if the
negligently performed function was proprietary.53

Judicial pressure on the legislature to remove state immunity
culminated in the court's abrogation of the sovereign immunity doctrine
in Vanderpool v. State. 4 In response, the Oklahoma legislature, in 1985,
statutorily abrogated state immunity by replacing the PTCA with the
Governmental Tort Claims Act (GTCA or the Act). 5 The GTCA
49. OKLA. STAT. tit. 51, § 153 (1978).
50. Although any indepth treatment of the constitutional issues is beyond the scope of this
note, it is well established that the concept of sovereign immunity has withstood due process and
equal protection attacks at the federal and state levels. For attacks on validity of Oklahoma's immunity, under both the Oklahoma Constitution and the United States Constitution, see, e.g., Hazlett v.
Board of County Commissioners, 168 Okla. 290, 32 P.2d 940 (1934); Board of County Commissioners v. Guaranty Loan & Investment Corp., 497 P.2d 423 (Okla. 1972); Neal v. Donahue, 611 P.2d
1125 (Okla. 1980). These challenges were often based on OKLA. CONST. art. II, § 6, which states
that "[t]he courts of justice of this State shall be open to every person and speedy and certain remedy
afforded for every wrong.. . ." Id
51. 344 P.2d 562 (Okla. 1959).
52. Id. at 569.
53. Comment, Texas Municipal Liability: An Examination of the State and Federal Causesof
Action, 40 BAYLOR L. REv. 595, 604 (1988). A governmental function is one that is traditionally
performed by the government and benefits the public in general, such as providing police protection,
fire protection, schools, and garbage collection. A proprietary function is undertaken when the government voluntarily engages in a business that is normally carried on by private companies intended
to produce revenue, such as operating swimming pools, hospitals and zoos. Id
Although the primary inroad into state sovereign immunity was the proprietary function exception until the Court's decision in Vanderpool v. State, 672 P.2d 1153, 1156-57 (Okla. 1983), two
further exceptions were judicially developed to narrow the application of the sovereign immunity
doctrine. In the first exception, the judiciary refused, in some cases, to apply the doctrine where
liability insurance had been procured. See Schrom v. Oklahoma Industrial Development, 536 P.2d
904 (Okla. 1975); Lamont Independent School Dist. # 1-95 v. Swanson, 548 P.2d 215 (Okla. 1976).
In the second exception, immunity was judicially held to be waived where the state was involved in a
contract. See State Bd. of Public Affairs v. Principal Funding Corp., 542 P.2d 503 (Okla. 1975).
54. 672 P.2d 1153 (Okla. 1983). When Vanderpool was decided in 1983, only five states, including Oklahoma, still clung to the doctrine of sovereign immunity as an absolute bar to liability.
Id at 1155.
55. OKLA. STAT. tit. 51, § 151-172 (1981 & Supp. 1990). See also 1984 Okla. Sess. Laws 811.
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waives sovereign immunity 56 for the "state"5 " and its employees in a limited class of cases. It eradicates the governmental-proprietary distinc-

tion,58 and provides a long list of carefully delineated exceptions to the
waiver of immunity.5

9

Oklahoma's GTCA, like the FTCA, contains a

discretionary function exemption.'

Defining what actions involve the

degree of discretion necessary to place them under the umbrella of the
discretionary exemption is a difficult task. If the discretionary exception
is broadly interpreted, almost every act by a government employee or
official could be construed as exempt from the immunity waiver, thus

effectively eviscerating the waiver of immunity embodied in Oklahoma's

GTCA.6 1 On the other hand, too narrow an interpretation frustrates the

original purposes of sovereign immunity. Courts must "strik[e] a balance
between the plain meaning of the statute and traditional legal concepts." 6 2 The dilemma leaves the interpreting court somewhat in the po-

sition of a "superlegislature" that must balance conflicting interests.63
56. OKLA. STAT. tit. 51, § 152.1 (Supp. 1990) states:
A. The State of Oklahoma does hereby adopt the doctrine of sovereign immunity. The
state, its political subdivisions, and all of their employees acting within the scope of their
employment, whether performing governmental or proprietary functions, shall be immune
from liability for torts.
B. The state, only to the extent and in the manner provided in this act, waives its immunity and that of its political subdivisions. In so waiving immunity, it is not the intent of the
state to waive any rights under the Eleventh Amendment to the United States
Constitution.
Id. (emphasis added). Section 153 provides:
A. The state or a political subdivision shall be liable for loss resulting from its torts or the
torts of its employees acting within the scope of their employment subject to the limitations
and exceptions specified in this act and only where the state or political subdivision, if a
private person entity, would be liable for money damages under the laws of this state ....

Id
57. OKLA. STAT. tit. 51 § 152(10) (Supp. 1990) provides that "'State' means the State of
Oklahoma or any office, department, agency, authority, commission, board, institution, hospital,
college, university, or other instrumentality thereof." Id.
58. Id.at § 152.1(A).
59. Id. at § 155.
60. Id at § 155. Section 155(5) provides, in pertinent part, that:
The state or a political subdivision shall not be liable if a loss or claim results from:
5. Performance of or the failure to exercise or perform any act or service which is in the
discretion of the state or political subdivision or its employes ....
Id
61. Nguyen, 788 P.2d 962, 964 (Okla. 1990).
62. Ricco, Developments in Tort Liability of The Federal Government Under the Federal Tort
Claims Act, 1987 ANN. SURv. AM. L. 619, 620.
63. I& at 620.
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III.
A.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

Facts

- On February 26, 1987, David Earl Hart, a mental patient known to
have violent tendencies, was given a limited release to outpatient status
by Central Oklahoma Community Health Center. 64 On July 10, 1987,
Hart randomly selected and fatally shot 18-year-old Dung Ngoc Nguyen,
a college student who was employed by a movie theatre in Oklahoma
City.65 Nguyen's parents sued the State of Oklahoma for his wrongful
death, claiming that the state, acting through the health center facility,
was negligent in releasing Hart.16 The State's motion to dismiss was
granted by the trial court, based on the authority of an Oklahoma statute
which permits the changing of a mental patient's status from inpatient to
outpatient "when, in the opinion of the person in charge, such transfer
will not be detrimental to the public welfare or injurious to the patient
...."67 The trial court held that the decision to release is a discretionary
function and, therefore, immune from tort liability.6 8 The parents of the
decedent appealed.
B. Issue
On appeal, the Oklahoma Supreme Court addressed the issue of
whether the decision to release a mental patient is a discretionary function under Oklahoma's GTCA that renders the state immune to liability
for injuries to a third party caused by a released mental patient.69
IV.

THE NGUYEN DECISION

The Oklahoma Supreme Court ruled that the State's decision to release a mental patient is not discretionary and, therefore, does not enjoy
immunity from liability for tortious actions.70 In evaluating the presence
64. Nguyen, 788 P.2d at 963.

65. Id. See also Appellants' Brief-in-Chief, supra note 23, at 1.
66. Nguyen, 788 P.2d at 963.
67. Nguyen, 788 P.2d at 963-64 n.2, (citing OKLA. STAT. tit. 43A, § 7-101(c) (Supp. 1986)).
Reflecting subsequent changes, outright discharge under current Oklahoma law requires that the
patient not be "dangerous to himself or others." OKLA.STAT. tit. 43A, § 7-101(B)(1) (Supp. 1990).

68. See Nguyen, 788 P.2d at 963.
69. Id.
70. Id. In so ruling, the court summarily overruled a contradictory 1988 appellate decision,
Powell v. State, 770 P.2d 903 (Okla. Ct. App. 1988), which had held that a release decision for
involuntary commitment was a discretionary act and exempt from liability. Id. Just three months

after the Nguyen decision removed the cloak of state immunity from tort liability for negligent release of mental patients, the Oklahoma Supreme Court encountered a case involving the liability of a
state hospital that released a diagnosed schizophrenic, who subsequently killed his stepfather. The

Published by TU Law Digital Commons, 1990

9

Tulsa Law Review, Vol. 26 [1990], Iss. 2, Art. 5
TULSA LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 26:273

of noniable discretion in decisions regarding the care of confined mental
patients, the Nguyen decision endorsed the use of the planning-operational test,7 1 significantly narrowing the scope of activity that will fall
within the discretionary exemption. 72 The court stated that the appropriate determinative factor for immunity is whether the state acted in
conformance with currently recognized standards, as referred to in an7
other exception to the waiver of immunity extended by the GTCA. 1
V.

ANALYSIS

In approaching the question of discretion in a decision to release or
transfer a mental patient, the Oklahoma Supreme Court examined various aspects of the problem. The Nguyen court considered how broadly
to apply the waiver of sovereign immunity by examining legislative intent.7 4 The court decided what approach or test best served the purpose
of the GTCA in marking the boundaries of discretionary functions. 75
The court also acknowledged the need to protect the public and the state,
and the competing policy interests at stake.7 6
A.

The Breadth of Sovereign Immunity

In considering the intended breadth of the GTCA waiver of immunity, the court examined the legislative intent embodied in the GTCA to
protect the state from widespread litigation arising from various routine
decisions that have unfortunate consequences, including the erroneous
release or transfer of a mental patient. 7 In assessing Oklahoma's
GTCA, the Nguyen court pointed out that the legislature had specifically
provided for immunity in other circumstances that involve injuries inflicted by state-confined individuals. 78 The inclusion of specific exemptions for activities involving prisoners and detained juveniles emphasizes
slaying occurred over two years after release. Although the summary judgment for the hospital was
upheld due to the remoteness and unforeseeability of the murder, the court held that "a mental
hospital may have a duty to foreseeable victims injured due to the negligent release of a psychiatric
patient ...." Wofford v. Eastern State Hosp., 795 P.2d 516, 517 (Okla. 1990).
71. Nguyen, 788 P.2d at 964.
72. Id.
73. Id. at 966. (Okla. Stat. tit. 51, § 155(28) (1981 & 1990 Supp.) states that "[t]he state or a
political subdivision shall not be liable if a loss or claim results from... [a]cts or ommissions done in
conformance with then current recognized standards." Id.
74. Nguyen, 788 P.2d at 964.
75. IaM
76. Ia.at 965-66.
77. Id. at 966.
78. Id. OKLA.STAT. tit. 51, § 155(23) & (24) (Supp. 1990) provides immunity for:
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the exclusion of any similar provision for mental patients.7 9 Furthermore, in amending the Act in 1988, the legislature split a former exemp-

tion that originally included immunity provisions for decisions involving

both criminal and juvenile detainees"0 to provide separate comprehensive
exemptions for each of those areas of government activity."1 This further
demonstrates the intentional exclusion of a specific provision extending
all-encompassing immunity to activities regarding mental patients.
The Oklahoma Supreme Court affirmed previous decisions in noting
that governmental immunity rooted in the discretionary function exemp-

tion is a very limited type of immunity

2

that will survive only where

3

specifically granted by the Act. Although the decision to release or
transfer a mental patient invariably involves some discretion, the court
reasoned that granting immunity in this area extends far too broad a
protection to those responsible for decision-making.8 4 Such a broad

grant of immunity opens the door to negligently expeditious, poorly-evaluated decisions that are dangerous to the public.8

Thus, the discretion-

ary exception cannot be used as the basis for indiscriminate protection of
the government.8 6
B.

Test to Identify DiscretionaryFunctions
The Nguyen court employed the widely-used planning-operational

23. Provision, equipping, operation or maintenance of any prison, jail or correctional facility,
or injuries resulting from the parole or escape of a prisoner by a prisoner to any other prisoner ....
24. Provision, equipping, operation or maintenance of any juvenile detention facility, or injuries resulting from the escape of a juvenile detainee, or injuries by a juvenile detainee to any other
juvenile detainee ....
79. Nguyen, 788 P.2d at 966. "It is our construction of the Act in its entirety that the legislature could but did not exempt the analogous situation of the release of a mental patient." Ia
80. See 1988 Okla. Sess. Laws 1085.
81. See supra note 78.
82. Nguyen, 788 P.2d at 964 (citing Robinson v. City of Bartlesville Bd. of Educ., 700 P.2d
1013 (Okla. 1985)). The court did not agree with the State's argument that Oklahoma's GTCA
should be interpreted as offering broader immunity than the FTCA because the FTCA requires that
the act be done with due care to come under the immunity umbrella, while this requirement of due
care is absent from the exemption provision in the GTCA. Answer Brief of Appellee at 15, Nguyen
v. State, 788 P.2d 962 (Okla.1990) (No. 71,844) (citing OKLA. STAT. tit. 51, § 155(5) (1986 Supp.);
28 U.S.C. § 2680(a)).
83. Nguyen, 788 P.2d. at 966 n.16 (citing Jarvis v. City of Stillwater, 669 P.2d. 1108 (Okla.
1983)). Jarvis states that "[o]nly those remnants of that ancient doctrine may be deemed currently
viable which draw their efficacy from an explicit provision in the Act[,]" and that "[u]nless explicitly
immunized by law, a political subdivision [or any other state entity] is now liable in tort." Id. at
1111 (emphasis in original).
84. Nguyen, 788 P.2d at 964.
85. Id. at 965-66.
86. Id. at 964-65.
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method in deciding whether the release of a mental patient is an immune,
discretionary act or one that is non-discretionary and ministerial. 7 The
test, developed by the United States Supreme Court in Dalehite v. United
States,"8 considers planning decisions discretionary, but regards operational-type activities and decisions as ministerial. Justice Wilson, author
of the Nguyen opinion, explained:
Under [the planning-operational] approach, once a discretionary policy decision has been made, government employees have a duty to execute the policy on the operational level without negligence. Moreover,
the general rule under the planning-operational test is that the discretion is exhausted by the initial adoption ofpolicy, and that decisions to
apply broad policy in specific cases are operational level decisions. 89
The basic weakness in any discretionary-ministerial analysis lies in
the fact that nearly every imaginable act involves some measure of discretion. 90 At what point does the amount of discretion involved render
immunity desirable, subordinating the individual's good to protect the
larger interest society holds in a functional government? The planningoperational approach answers this question by sheltering basic strategic
decisions which involve balancing of policy considerations. 9 1 These decisions customarily occur at the beginning of the administrative process.
In deciding what test to use, the Nguyen court noted that the planning-operational approach was utilized in Robinson v. City of Bartlesville
Board of Education,92 where the court held that planning actions are discretionary while operational ones are non-discretionary or ministerial.
Robinson resolved the question of where planning or discretionary actions ended and ministerial or operational actions began in the Bartlesville School Board's construction and maintenance of a parking lot. 93
The court held that the Board's decision to construct the parking lot was
a discretionary decision based on policy, but that it was operational to
carry out the decision to construct and maintain the parking lot in a
87. Id at 964.
88. 346 U.S. 15 (1953).
89. Nguyen, 788 P.2d at 965 (quoting 19 AM. JUR. 2D ProofofFacts 583, 594-95 (1979)) (emphasis added).
90. Eisenberg, The Vicarious Liability of Governmental Entities: Judicial and Legislative Attempts to Reduce Accountabilityfor Tortious Acts, 1987 ANN. SURV. AM. L. 637, 650 (1987).
91. Nguyen, 788 P.2d at 965.
92. Nguyen, 788 P.2d at 964 (citing Robinson v. City of Bartlesville Bd. of Educ., 700 P.2d
1013 (Okla. 1985)).
93. Robinson, 700 P.2d at 1017.
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reasonably safe manner.9 4 Promoting one of the basic purposes of discretionary immunity, this approach protects polieymaking decisions of
other governmental branches from judicial review. 95
The Nguyen court reasoned that the planning-operational approach
was similarly applicable to the release of a mental patient,96 relying on
Lipari v.Sears, Roebuck & Co.97 Lipari involved the release of a Veterans Administration psychiatric patient to outpatient status. 98 Following
release, the patient withdrew himself from the intended continuing outpatient treatment and ultimately injured a woman and killed her husband.9 9 The woman sued the government and the seller of the gun for
the wrongful death of her husband and her own personal injuries. 1°0 In
its motion to dismiss, the government asserted the discretionary function
exception as a complete defense. 101
The Lipari court stated that the purpose of the discretionary function exception is "to bar tort litigation challenging governmental decisions which are founded on a balancing of competing policy
considerations."10 2 In considering the application of the discretionary
function exemption, the court noted that the plaintiff challenged the
"V.A.'s negligent implementation of its rules," or operational decisions,
rather than the "V.A.'s rules or policies," which would be planning decisions.10 3 Weighing this factor against the government, the Lipari court
asserted that each and every exercise ofjudgment by a governmental offi1°4
cial cannot provide a basis for use of the discretionary exemption.
The court held that the decision to release the patient to outpatient status
was a non-discretionary, operational function and denied the government's motion to dismiss.105 Similarly, the Nguyen court reasoned that
only governmental actions that involve an appraisal and weighing of
94. Id.
95. Note, supra note 17, at 946.
96. Nguyen, 788 P.2d at 965-66.
97. 497 F. Supp. 185 (D. Neb. 1980).

98. Id. at 187.
99. Id.
100. Id.
101. Id. at 188.
102. Id. at 195 (emphasis added).
103. Id. The Lipari court noted that there are adequate, effective ways to scrutinize the decision
to release a mental patient for actionable negligence, just as there are ways to evaluate similar decisions made by private therapists. Accordingly, "[i]n
applying the [tort] standard, the Court will not
be reviewing the reasonableness of the V.A.'s policies, but will be only assessing the reasonableness
of the therapist's evaluation of [the patient]." Id.
104. Id at 195-96.
105. Id. at 196.
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competing policy
interests are shielded by the discretionary function
10 6
exemption.

C. Protection of the Public and the State
1. Protecting the Public
The Nguyen court emphasized the underlying policy considerations
of public welfare and safety inherent in granting state immunity to decisions to release mental patients.10 7 The court focused on the State of
Washington's treatment of a gruesome case, Petersen v. State,1" 8 involving the Washington State Tort Claims Act (TCA)1 9 The Nguyen court
observed that the facts in Petersen demonstrate the inherent danger to
the public of broadly applied immunity and strongly "illustrate one of
the overriding policy considerations affecting our decision today-public
welfare and safety." 110 It is a rightful function of government to safeguard the public from dangerous individuals held in state facilities.11 1
The statutory foundation of Petersen, the Washington TCA, provides:
The state of Washington, whether acting in its governmental or proprietary capacity, shall be liable for damages arising out of112its tortious
conduct to the same extent as if it were a private person.

Following enactment of the TCA, Washington courts preserved the longestablished discretionary policy of immunity enjoyed by the State of
1 13
Washington prior to the Act, but narrowed its application.
Applying the Lipari court reasoning, the Petersen court found that
the decision to release a mental patient was not a policy decision. 1 4 The
106. Nguyen, 788 P.2d at 965.
107. Id. at 965-66.
108. 100 Wash. 2d 421, 671 P.2d 230 (1983). In Petersen, a mental patient was diagnosed as a
drug abuser suffering from schizophrenia and was detained in a state hospital after an episode of selfmutilation. Less than one month later, he was allowed to visit his mother for a day. He failed to
return and was caught recklessly driving a car. Despite this, he was released the next day. He
shortly thereafter injured Petersen in a car accident and six months later, killed two people and
raped another. 100 Wash. 2d at 423-25, 438, 671 P.2d at 234-35, 242.
109. Nguyen, 788 P.2d at 965.
110. Id. at 965-66.
111. Id. at 966. "Protection of the public from the harmful tendency of those incarcerated in
State institutions is, we hold, a governmental function. . . ." Id. (quoting Neal v. Donahue, 611
P.2d 1125, 1128 (Okla. 1980)).
112. WASH. REV. CODE § 4.92.090 (1963). Oklahoma's Act similarly provides for the eradication of the distinction between governmental and proprietary acts and holds the state liable where a
private person would be. See supra note 56 for text of Oklahoma's Act.
113. Petersen, 100 Wash. 2d at 431-32, 671 P.2d at 239-40 (1983).
114. Id at 240-41.
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Petersen court followed the majority trend in holding that the sole purpose of the immunity found in discretionary functions was to protect policy decisions from judicial evaluation.' 5 Again, to qualify as a
discretionary act, a decision must involve a balancing of policy considerations.'1 6 Based on the failure of the discretionary exception defense, the
State of Washington had to defend itself on grounds that the decision was
7 This approach provides the
not negligent. 11
public with more protection
because it discourages questionable releases.
2.

Protecting the State

In addition to the necessity of safeguarding public welfare, the state
must be allowed some measure of protection. Without some shield, the
state could possibly sustain liability for the release of any mental patient
who was discoverably violent." 8 The Nguyen court held that this protection could not arise from the discretionary function exemption. Rather,
the court stated that state decisions to release mental patients are furnished the intended degree of protection by the exception which exempts
"[a]cts or omissions done in conformance with then current recognized
standards.""' 9 Indicating that no protection can be extended to negligence, the court stated that "[t]he state cannot exercise its judgment
without due regard for the known facts and circumstances and have the
advantage of immunity under our Act."' 20 The Nguyen court remanded
the case with instructions to the trial court to "determine whether the
state acted within the then current recognized standards.""12 In summary, the court stated that, "the question is not whether the release of a
mental patient is a protected discretionary function but whether acts allegedly committed by those charged with the release of mental patients
fall below current recognized professional standards."' 22
D. Competing Policy Interests
Interpretation of the discretionary function exception as it relates to
115. Id. at 240 (citing King v. Seattle, 84 Wash. 2d 239, 246, 525 P.2d 228, 233 (1974)).

116. Id
117. Id at 240-41.
118. 19 AM. JUR. 2d ProofofFacts 583, 604 (1979). "[flf the releasee's prior psychiatric history

includes evidence indicating the possibility or likelihood that he might be dangerous or harm someone if released, a release may be found to have been negligent or even grossly negligent." I.
119. Nguyen, 788 P.2d at 966 (quoting OKLA. STAT. tit. 51, § 155(28) (1981 & Supp. 1990)).
120. Id.

121. Nguyen, 788 P.2d at 966.
122. Id. See also supra note 70 and accompanying text.
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the release of mental patients necessarily involves the weighing of coniicting interests.12 3 The conclusion that a decision is discretionary is
often, in reality, a complex policy determination. At odds are the interests of both the government and public in rehabilitating the mentally ill
and ensuring public safety.' 24 The goal of rehabilitating the mentally ill
could be swallowed by the goal of averting possible risk of injury to
members of society. Imposing liability on the government for the behav-

ior of released patients could thwart the delivery of optimal care to these
individuals.' 25 Prioritizing these interests is difficult. Underlying, but
often overlooked, societal goals support the efficient release of individuals
who suffer from mental illness.' 26 Society is benefited by the release of
institutionalized mental patients, and potentially harmed by premature
or inappropriate releases. 2 7
The goal of our entire tort compensation system, the just allocation
of losses,"' is eviscerated by inappropriate governmental immunity. "Society should not be subjected to a risk of harm over which it has no
control."' 2 9 Following a judicial trend toward protection of the public

safety interests with compensation for injury, 1 ° the Fifth Circuit Court
of Appeals stated in Payton v. United States,'3 ' that "[t]he more serious,
in terms of physical or mental impairment, and isolated -the loss the
closer the question becomes as to whether the individual can be expected
123. Travin & Bluestone, Dischargingthe Violent PsychiatricInpatient, 32 J. FORENSIC SCI. 999,
1003 (1987) states:
The courts in California and New York, which have had numerous cases of negligent release, have pointed out the need of the public to accept certain facts about the treatment of
mental disorders, including the facts that psychiatric treatment is not an exact science, that
rehabilitative visits outside the hospital are often therapeutic, and that there are inherent
risks in releasing patients which ultimately must be balanced against the needs of the patient to be given the opportunity to improve and return to society.

IdL
124. See Comment, supra note 38, at 484. "[R]ehabilitative programs are so vital that each
member of society must accept the risk presented by a released patient." Id. (citing Beauchene v.
Synanon Foundation, Inc., 88 Cal. App. 3d 342, 151 Cal. Rptr. 796 (1979)).
125. Leesfield, Negligence of Mental Health Professionals: What ConductBreaches Standardsof
Care, 23 TRIAL 57 (1987). "Courts must carefully balance imposing liability against discouraging
the least restrictive treatment. Failure to use the least restrictive treatment could impede patient
recovery." Id
126. Annotation, Liability of One Releasing Institutionalized Mental Patient for Harm He
Causes, 38 A.L.R. 3d 699, 702 (1971).
127. 19 AM. JUR. 2D Proofof Facts 583, 596 (1979). See also Comment, supra note 11, at 46466.

128.

PROSSER

& KEETON, supra note 9, § 1, at 6.

129. Comment, supra note 38, at 484-85.
130. See Hicks v. United States, 511 F.2d 407 (D.C. Cir. 1975); Eanes v. United States, 407 F.2d
823 (4th Cir. 1969); White v. United States, 317 F.2d 13 (4th Cir. 1963).
131. 636 F.2d 132 (5th Cir. 1981).
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to absorb the loss as incident to an acceptable social or political risk of
governmental activities." 1" 2 Certainly society's individual members,
when unnecessarily injured by this risk, should not find themselves
blocked by governmental immunity from judicial recourse. This conflict

has spawned a continuing struggle.
The Nguyen court acknowledged that society has at least a limited

right to isolation from mentally ill individuals,"' 3 especially those with a

history of dangerous behavior. 3 4 When the government is executing established policy decisions, there is a recognized duty to the public in general to use reasonable measures to protect society.13 5 Studies indicate
13 6
that a growing number of mental patients have a criminal history.
This is largely due to our progressing views of criminal rehabilitation and
the mitigating power granted to evidence of mental illness. 137 The illusive goal is to encourage optimal care, including complete and limited
release of the mental patients, while avoiding injuries caused by negligent
release decisions.

132. Id at 144.
133. Nguyen v. State, 788 P.2d 962, 966 (Okla. 1990). See also supra note 107 and accompanying text. Contra Bowers v. De Vito, 686 F.2d 616 (7th Cir. 1982), which stated that the public has
"no constitutional right to be protected by the state against being murdered by criminals or
madmen." Id. at 618. In other words, a person has no absolute right to be protected from crimes
committed by the mentally ill.
134. See Mestrovic & Cook, The DangerousnessStandard: What Is It and How Is It Used?, 8
INT'L J. LAW & PSYCHIATRY 443 (1986).
135. Payton, 636 F.2d at 147-48 (footnote omitted). The Oklahoma Supreme Court recently
decided that a mental hospital may have a duty to foreseeable victims. See supra note 70.
136. "Crimes committed by the mentally ill appear to be widespread. Each year, 20,000 persons
charged with crimes or convicted of crimes enter mental institutions." Carmen, Civil Liabilities of
Government Psychotherapistsand Agencies for the Release of the Mentally Ill, 12 J. PSYCHIATRY &
LAW 183, 184 (1984). See also Travin, supra note 123, at 1002 nn.25-27 (citing Steadman, Cocozza,
& Melick, Explaining the IncreasedAr est Rate Among Mental Patients: The Changing Clientele of
State Hospitals, 135 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 816 (July 1978); Steadman, Vanderwyst, & Ribner, ComparingArrest Rates of Mental Patientsand CriminalOffenders, 135 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 1218 (Oct.
1973); Rabkin, CriminalBehavior of Discharged Mental Patients: a CriticalAppraisal of the Research, 86 PSYCHOLOGICAL BULL. 1 (Jan. 1979)).
137. See Carmen, supra note 136. The author states: "Another development has been in the
insanity defense, where more states are opting for the 'guilty but mentally ill' verdict. This assures
that such persons will serve time in a mental institution, the release date being determined by administrative agencies." Id at 185.
In some instances where the confinement and treatment of a mental patient is court-ordered, the
doctrine of judicial immunity has been extended to protect those carrying out these judicial mandates. See Tobis v. State, 52 Wash. App. 150, 758 P.2d 534 (1988); Adkins v. Clark County, 105
Wash. 2d 675, 717 P.2d 275 (1986). Another Washington court held that, "[w]hen psychiatrists or
mental health providers are appointed by the court and render an advisory opinion to the court on a
criminal defendant's mental condition, they are acting as an arm of the court and are protected from
suit by absolute judicial immunity." Tobis, 758 P.2d at 537 (quoting Bader v. State, 43 Wash. App.
223, 226, 716 P.2d 925, 927 (1986)).
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VI. FUTURE IMPLICATIONS
A. Development of CurrentRecognized Standards
The Nguyen court held that the determinative factor for granting
state immunity is the adherence to "current recognized standards" required in a separate GTCA exception. 138 Perhaps the most difficult challenge arising from this decision will be the development of acceptable
current recognized standards.13 9 The extent of the state's duty to discover violent propensities in detainees will have to be established" 4 and
a method must be generated to determine if that duty has been ful-

filled. " ' Various approaches have been taken by courts, but no approach

has gained the widespread confidence of the judiciary.' 42
The Nguyen court expressed thoughtful recognition "of the fact that
psychiatry is not an exact science and psychiatrists and/or therapists
cannot predict with certainty the future acts of their patients,"' 4 3 indicating that the requirement of conformity with current recognized standards is a potentially broad hoop to jump through.
This

acknowledgment may offer a measure of leeway and protection for the
decision-maker while leaving negligent, incompetent decisions open to
liability. Acknowledging that the lack of predictive technology makes
accurate prophecy difficult, the Nguyen court avoided the formulation of
specific guidelines for meeting the conformity-to-current-standards
44
requirement.1
The statutory foundation for the acceptable Oklahoma standard re-

lating to the discharge or transfer of patients is set forth in Oklahoma's
Mental Health Act."' Before discharge, this statute requires that the
138. OKLA. STAT. tit. 51, § 155(28) (Supp. 1990).
139. See generally Mestrovic & Cook, supra note 134.
140. Grimm v. Arizona Bd. of Pardons & Paroles, 115 Ariz. 260, 564 P.2d 1227 (1977). (A
leading case involving the parole of a prisoner which stated that the care exercised in evaluating the
potential releasee must be commensurate with the potential risk).
141. See Annotation, supra note 126 at 700. Prevailing standards and guidelines are ambiguous.
For example, one suggestion has been that the general standard of care is that of adequate "care,
skill, and knowledge" to avoid being held liable. Id.
142. See supra note 126.
143. Nguyen, 788 P.2d at 966. The United States Supreme Court noted that "[p]sychiatry is not,
however, an exact science, and psychiatrists disagree widely and frequently on what constitutes
mental illness, or the appropriate diagnosis to be attached to given behavior and symptoms, or cure
and treatment, and on likelihood of future dangerousness." Ake v. Oklahoma, 470 U.S. 68, 81
(1985).
144. Nguyen, 788 P.2d at 966.
145. OKLA. STAT. tit. 43A, § 7-101 (Supp. 1990) provides in part:
B. The person in charge shall discharge a patient:
1. Who is not dangerousto himself or others....
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person in charge formulate an opinion about the dangerousness of the
patient. 14 6 In situations involving the transfer of a patient to outpatient
status, the person in charge must determine whether a transfer to outpatient status is "detrimental to the public welfare," according to the rules
prescribed by the Commissioner of Mental Health. 4 7 It is currently unknown whether the Commissioner's decisions in formulating rules for the
transfer of mental patients to outpatient or other nonhospital status will
be considered discretionary, planning decisions - decisions that involve
the balancing of competing policy interests. The Commissioner's decisions could be considered merely operational ones that are subject to judicial scrutiny. If the Commissioner's decisions are regarded as
operational and non-discretionary, this opens the avenue of governmental liability for his actions.
In the future, courts will have to decide what pre-decision acts conform to current recognized standards. Oklahoma's basic statutory foundation needs supplemental guidelines that specify adequate methodology
to be used in forming non-negligent release and transfer decisions.
Resolving difficult release questions is onerous without established guidelines that are supported by the professional community.
In reference to release and transfer, how does the decision-maker
form a non-negligent opinion about the dangerousness of the patient?
The answer has been established in assorted cases by employing several
methods, including the use of the malpractice standard of ordinary
care148 and the gauge of professional judgment. 4 9 As an alternative to
the professional standard or the criterion used to establish malpractice, a
C In accordancewith rulesprescribedby the Commissioner,a person in charge may transfer a patient to an outpatientor other nonhospitalstatus when, in the opinion of the person in
charge, such transfer will not be detrimental to the public welfare or injurious to the patient
and the necessary treatment may be continued on that basis .....
Id. (emphasis added). In 1989, the legislature added the current requirement: "that the patient not
be dangerous to himself or others." (S.B. No. 358, 42nd Leg., 1st Reg. Sess., 1989 Okla. Sess. Laws

1451, 1452).
146. OKLA. STAT. tit. 43A, § 7-101(B)(1) (Supp. 1990). See also Mestrovic & Cook, supra note
134.
147. OKLA. STAT. tit. 43A, § 7-101(C) (Supp. 1990). "Commissioner" is the person selected and
appointed by the Mental Health Board. Id at § 1-103(e).
148. See Perreira v. State, 768 P.2d 1198 (Colo. 1989). "The duty of the psychiatrist in such a
case is to use reasonable care, in accordance with the knowledge and skill ordinarily possessed by
psychiatric practitioners under similar circumstances, to protect potential victims from future acts of
violence by the patient." Id. at 1213.
149. Nguyen, 788 P.2d at 966 refers to "current recognized professional standards." Perhaps
public welfare should not be dependent on professional standards formulated by the very group that
uses these self-made standards to establish due care.
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three-judge dissent in Perreirav. State150 suggested adoption of the Ohio
Supreme Court's method, which entails a three-part judicially mandated

test to establish liability. 151 The Ohio test accommodates competing policy concerns1 52 by requiring, among other common sense provisions, "a
thorough evaluation" of the likelihood of violence coupled with "good
1 53
faith decision[s]" to release a mental patient.
Another possibility, the requirement of a dispositive committee," 4 is

a promising alternative to the one-man, "person in charge" approach
called for in the Oklahoma Mental Health Act. 155 Such an approach has
advantages for the patient and, because of its enhanced defensibility, for
the state. Because a committee of various individuals make the decision

to release or transfer the patient, there is less potential for negligence and
error.

B. FurtherImplications
A growing segment of the hospitalized mentally ill are considered
dangerous, escalating the number of confined mental patients whose re-

lease could create state liability.156 Unless custodial authorities are given

appropriate release guidelines, this developing area of liability could
1 57
cause significant overcrowding and undertreatment of patients.
150. 768 P.2d 1198, 1226 (Colo. 1989).
151. Id. at 1226-27 (citing Littleton v. Good Samaritan Hosp. & Health Center, 39 Ohio St. 3d
86, 99, 529 N.E.2d 449, 460 (1988)).
152. IM. at 1227.
153. Littleton, 39 Ohio St. 3d at 99, 529 N.E.2d at 460. The Ohio Supreme Court held:
[A] psychiatrist will not be held liable for the violent acts of a voluntarily hospitalized
mental patient subsequent to the patient's discharge if. (1) the patient did not manifest
violent propensities while being hospitalized and there was no reason to suspect the patient
would become violent after discharge, or (2) a thorough evaluation of the patient's propensity for violence was conducted, taking into account all relevant factors, and a good faith
decision was made by the psychiatrist that the patient had no violent propensity, or (3) the
patient was diagnosed as having violent propensities and, after a thorough evaluation of the
severity of the propensities and a balancing of the patient's interests and the interests of
potential victims, a treatment plan was formulated in good faith which included discharge
of the patient. Id.
154. See Travin & Bluestone, supra note 123, at 1006. "Our experience with this committee
[approach] argues that it not only makes good clinical sense, but it also makes good legal sense."
Such a committee could include the independent senior consulting psychiatrist, the person in charge,
and the staff members actually involved with the patient. Id.
155. OiuA. STAT. tit. 43A, § 7-101(B) & (C) (Supp. 1990).
156. Several studies have indicated that approximately eleven percent of hospitalized mental
patients have been violent prior to admission. Travin, supra note 123, at 1000. See also Carmen,
supra note 136.
157. See Carmen,supra note 136, at 184. Carmen notes a very significant trend in mental health
care toward deinstitutionalization. Reduced funding and staffing have reflected this longstanding
trend toward community treatment. Thus, the system suffers from widespread inadequacy to support a growing number of institutionalized persons. If liability were imposed on the psychotherapist
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Mounting patient admissions coupled with decreasing releases could
place unacceptable financial and moral burdens on society. Supporting
the increased institutionalized population could cripple the public treasury158 as surely as the blanket exposure to tort liability promoted by the
over-zealous application of the waiver of immunity. An increasing
number of individuals could be funneled into a system constricted by
lack of funding and manpower. The inhibiting effect of potential liability
would impede the outflow. These considerations must be balanced with
the importance of public safety concerns.
Additionally, by widening the door for government tort liability in
the area of released mental patients, the Nguyen decision could advance
the potential for state liability for other mental health care decisions. Liability could extend to the initial decision of whether or not to confine.
The state could be charged with tort liability for the failure to initially
institutionalize an individual who later injures himself or others. If liability for non-commitment develops, more and more of the segment of
our population that might be evaluated as "dangerous" could pass
through the loop of the institutionalized mentally ill. Another possibility
that arises from the Nguyen holding is liability for failure to release. A
patient experiencing continued confinement designed to avert state liability could sue the state for not releasing them.1" 9 Realistic, effective
guidelines must be developed that address the inherent dilemma in
mental health treatment between patient welfare and public safety.
VII.

CONCLUSION

By stripping off the protection of the discretionary function exception to the state's waiver of immunity, the Nguyen decision forces the
state to take a closer look at potential negligence in mental health care
decisions.
or the state each time the prediction of the future course of mental illness was wrong, few releases
would ever be made. Ia
158. See Ricco, supra note 62, at 630. Also consider that liability for release ultimately imposes
a heavier burden to commit those individuals who could be considered dangerous, having the detrimental synergistic effect of increasing the likelihood of injury caused by released patients simply

because more individuals have been committed. See also Travin, supra note 123, at 1001.
159. Courts are traditionally very protective of an individual's right to freedom as evidenced by
the insufficiency of the preponderance of the evidence standard and the requirement of clear and
convincing evidence to initially have a person committed. See Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418

(1979).
Also, it is possible that an individual's dangerousness is not adequate reason to deny his liberty.
Even if a criminal is considered to be dangerous, but not insane, he is set free after he serves his
sentence. See O'Connor v. Donaldson, 422 U.S. 563 (1975), where a mental patient sued the government for his continued confinement, depriving him of his constitutional right to liberty.
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The specific circumstances of the case are often the only way to decide the matter. Although at least one court concluded that the public
had to absorb the risk of releasing "rehabilitated" mental patients,16°
courts generally will find liability unless an honest error has been made.
The critical emerging question is whether the decision was made with
due care.
The Nguyen decision will lead to the demise in Oklahoma of the
jurisdictional issue forced by the immunity question and suggests that
future decisions in the area of governmental mental health care will focus
on conformance with current recognized standards. It will lead to better
resolutions based on full trials and factual development rather than summary disposition based on immunity.
DianaH. Clark
160. Beauchene v. Synanon Foundation, Inc., 88 Cal. App. 3d 342, 347, 151 Cal. Rptr. 796, 79899 (1979).
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